Corruption: Debate with Danny Kaufmann by Khan, Mushtaq
TRANSCRIPT OF DEVELOPMENT DRUMS 
[EPISODE 20 – CORRUPTION] 
 
Host: Owen Barder.   Guests: Mushtaq Khan & Daniel Kaufmann 
 
Listen to the podcast: http://developmentdrums.org/228 
 
Owen Barder 
This is Development Drums Number 20. My name is Owen Barder in Addis Ababa. Today we’ve got a 
really interesting discussion about corruption. And I’ll be joined by my guests, Daniel Kaufmann and by 
Mushtaq Khan. Before I introduce my guests, let me say a big thank you to Alison Evans who took over 
this seat for Development Drums 19, and to the folks at ODI for making that episode possible. 
 
I am joined by Prof. Mushtaq Khan, Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
or SOAS, here at the University of London. Mushtaq, thanks for coming on to Development Drums. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
My pleasure. 
 
Owen Barder 
And I am also joined by Daniel Kaufmann who is a Senior Fellow in Global Economy and Development at 
the Brookings Institution. And he was previously the celebrated director of the World Bank Institute. And 
he led work there on governance and anti-corruption. His areas of expertise are public sector and regulatory 
reform, governance and anti-corruption. Daniel, thanks for coming on Development Drums. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Thanks, Owen. 
 
Owen Barder 
Let’s start with I think an issue that a lot of people who are not development experts find puzzling, which is 
why it is that common sense tells us that corruption is an important issue and yet a lot of people who work 
in development seem less concerned about it than perhaps popular opinion out there suggests they should 
be.  
 
And really one way of phrasing this question is whether corruption causes poverty, which I think, Daniel, is 
something that you’ve argued quite strongly, or whether it’s the poverty that causes the corruption, which is 
something, Mushtaq, that you’ve argued we should focus on.  
 
Let’s try and unpack. I mean, presumably, in some sense both is true. But let us try and unpack which way 
round this causation is working. And, Daniel, if we can start with you, you’ve claimed that countries can 
get a very large dividend from better governance. What’s the evidence that you would want to point us to 
that if we could tackle corruption we’d get faster poverty reduction. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Well, at one aggregate level, we can point to the work that by now a number of academics have done that 
we – we did it with Aart Kraay long time ago, almost a decade ago, which is a 300% dividend, 
development dividend of good governance and anti-corruption we call it. So a country that makes a serious 
effort and does improve in controlling corruption can expect in the very long term so that payoff takes 
place over a very long period of time, and expect a threefold increase in per capita income, going from 
1,000 to $3,000 per capita per year or from 4 to 12,000 and – 
 
Owen Barder 
And that’s just from tackling corruption. Just by tackling corruption you can get from 1,000 to $3,000 per 
capita income. 
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Daniel Kaufmann 
Well, you are getting already into a complicated arena because one of the things that they have for better or 
worse quoted me many times is the expression that one doesn’t fight corruption by fighting corruption. So 
there is no such thing as just tackling corruption; by just instituting an anti-corruption commission or 
adopting another law that won’t work. One has to look at the quality of all the key institutions; whether 
there is a free press, democratic accountability, the issue of property rights. So you have to do homework 
on governance in general to tackle corruption. There is no such thing as just tackling corruption. 
 
Owen Barder 
We’ll come in a second to the question of how we tackle corruption and what the best way of doing it is. 
But Mushtaq, what’s your take? Do you buy this idea that if you can find a way to improve governance in 
corruption that that enhances growth and poverty reduction? 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
Look, there’s absolutely no dispute that if you compare rich countries, which have achieved development 
and you look at their levels of corruption and you compare them with poor countries, which are struggling 
and are poverty-stricken and so on, there is a huge difference in corruption between them, okay? So rich 
countries are generally less corrupt and they are rich. And poor countries are more corrupt and they are 
poor. There is absolutely no question about that. 
 
Now the question is, so if you – the problem is to show what are the preconditions for getting from poverty 
to prosperity. That’s what the policy issue is really all about. Nobody is disputing that corruption is a bad 
thing, that corruption has a lot of negative effects, that corruption damages people, that we would all love to 
live in a corruption-free world. I think those are not issues at all. There is no disagreement amongst 
anybody on those things. And a country with lower corruption is better than a country with higher 
corruption, period. 
 
Owen Barder 
But specifically, to Danny’s point which – his work with Kraay that if you can reduce corruption, then you 
reduce poverty. Do you believe that? 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
No. I think there the debate becomes extremely complicated. There are many different types of corruption, 
number one. Some types of corruption can be reduced in poor countries and will have a dividend on 
development. But there are many other problems in developing countries, and the question that you’ve 
posed at the very beginning is vital which is, why are all poor countries corrupt?  
 
And the answer is not a simple one that poverty causes corruption because poor people are hungry, so they 
steal. It’s not that simple because actually if you look at poor countries, the poorest people are not corrupt 
at all. It’s not the poor who are corrupt. It’s – somebody else is corrupt, okay? And so the question really is 
why are emerging ruling classes in poor countries so corrupt compared to ruling classes in rich countries? 
 
And if you put that question in that historical way, a long-term historical question, I think econometrics 
can’t answer those kinds of questions, so I have a real problem with econometric approaches for 
establishing causality there, and the question is a slightly different one. There are a number of structural 
features, which I have identified in my work, which means that – which shows that developing countries 
are structurally more corrupt and there is nothing much you can do about in the short run. And can I give 
you a couple of examples? 
 
Owen Barder 
Before you do, let me just check with Danny. So here the proposition is that poor countries are structurally 
more corrupt and so you need to tackle the poverty to tackle the corruption. Daniel, do you buy that? 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
No. Look, I think at some point one has to move beyond – and I agree with Mushtaq – beyond the lofty 
econometric debate. We claim, and there is a set of about four or five refereed articles in the best journals 
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that one can untangle causality with the best econometrics from countries all over the world, and one shows 
that there’s a causal link going from first improving governance and anti-corruption to better development 
outcomes including growth and incomes. 
 
The reverse causality is debatable. Some like us have not found much play because there are countries that 
get a lot of money from oil and have not been able to transfer that into better governance and others have 
done well. So on average, it washes out. But that’s a debate we can have until midnight. I agree with 
Mushtaq that it’s not enough just to look at these big econometrics studies. 
 
It’s very important to go to the micro data. We have shown at the project level just using all the 
development projects that the bank has funded that where there is corruption, in general, in the country that 
affects essentially the delivery, the implementation, the quality and whether the project succeeds or fails. 
There is a lot of evidence at the country level. 
 
There is this great book that everybody should read that just came out about Kenya, It’s Our Turn to Eat by 
Michela Wrong. I think rather than having very lofty academic and econometric arguments, which we can 
do for three days, the more we look at what’s happening on the ground. I have seen what’s happening in 
Chile, my own country, and how it has made it by improving governance and anti-corruption compared 
with its neighbors or compared – 
 
Owen Barder 
Let’s hear from Mushtaq on his answer to that point, which is in a sense it stands to reason that if you 
improve corruption that that reduces poverty but also the point you – that I interrupted you before you were 
about to make, about the ways that entrenched elites in poor countries, that there is corruption inherent in 
that system. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
I think that the big methodological issues about evidence and data are actually vitally important, okay? If 
you compare countries with slightly more and slightly less corruption, and slightly less and slightly higher 
growth rates, it is true that – and I have no dispute with Danny, that everything else being the same, a little 
less corruption is better. 
 
The question is – the problem that Danny doesn’t look at is if you look at every successful transition, if you 
look at the China, the South Korea, the Malaysia, the Thailand, the Japan before that, okay, what was the 
process through which countries actually developed as opposed to comparing Kenya with Tanzania and so 
on. 
 
There’s no historical evidence of a country which first reduced corruption and then developed. This is my 
problem with the whole econometric exercise. And the reason for that is – the reason why you can’t do that 
are those structural reasons, which we really need to understand. 
 
So, one problem is that poor countries are going through transitions. They are going through huge social 
change. The problem of corruption is that if you have a stable ruling class, if you are a poor country but you 
are stable, then the ruling class is legitimate. You will actually have very low corruption. 
 
The Mughal Empire was not very corrupt. India today is highly corrupt, why, because it’s going through an 
enormous social transition. New classes are coming up. New forms of social organizations are coming up. 
In rich countries, there is a lot of mechanisms through which the rich preserve and protect their privilege 
and acquire privilege and in economics, this is called rent-seeking, okay? 
 
The difference is that in rich countries a lot of the rent-seeking is legal. Some of it is very damaging. And 
some of it is not so damaging. And some of it is very beneficial but it’s legal. The problem in poor 
countries is that much of that rent-seeking, the way through which emerging elites buy themselves privilege 
and protect their assets and so on is structurally illegal because they are not legitimate yet. It’s a process of 
transition.  
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And that happened actually by the way in some relatively rich countries like Eastern Europe when they 
were going through their transitions you had very high spikes in corruption. That kind of corruption is 
produced by the process of transition itself.  
 
We should get away from that legal versus illegal division between rent-seeking and go down to what I 
think is much more important, which is why are some types of rent-seeking so damaging and how do we 
address those, and why are some types of rent-seeking in transition economies actually structural, which we 
can’t do anything about. And if we try and attack that actually we do damage the patient, it doesn’t help the 
patient. 
 
And there’s one other type of corruption, which is absolutely fundamental in poor countries, which I think 
economists don’t really understand, and that is political corruption. And the reason why all developing 
countries have significant amounts of political corruption ‘til they’re middle-middle income is that the way 
in which you buy political stability in rich countries, which is by having a 30 to 40 to 50% tax base and 
then redistributing a lot to people is just not possible in poor countries. So you can’t achieve political 
stability through that mechanism.  
 
There are huge aspirations. There are huge instabilities and violence and wars going on and civil wars 
going on. Elites in developing countries achieve stability through processes of patron-client politics where, 
to put it very crudely, what they do is they identify the most powerful and the most dangerous coalitions 
and they buy them off, and they include them in the government. And the fight is between different 
coalitions of very dangerous people. 
 
That kind of political corruption is – if you try to tackle that you actually blow those countries up, okay? So 
you need to understand what you’re doing. There are some very damaging types of corruption, which we 
need to address. And you don’t identify what those damaging types are through regression exercises. 
 
Owen Barder 
Let’s come on in just a second before – to the question of what kinds of governance improvements matter 
and matter for development and growth. But let me just go back, Danny, to give you a chance to come back 
on that point. Mushtaq’s point is, if I may summarize it, and you tell me if I’ve got this wrong, that a part of 
the process of the economic change is to do with the redistribution of wealth and power and in an 
environment that is – essentially, we call that ‘corruption’ where it’s illegal, and in poor countries it’s 
inevitable. As they go through that process of change, there is illegal transferring of wealth and power. And 
that’s part of the development. That’s an inevitable part of the development process 
 
Mushtaq Khan  
And then illegal – illegitimate mechanism of protecting the assets of those who are themselves illegitimate 
because they haven’t been there long enough. So it becomes legitimate. 
 
Owen Barder 
Daniel, there’s no development without corruption? 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Look. It’s not just no development, but there’s no – nowadays, if there was any doubt that we know that 
there are no world affairs without some of the wheels being turned by corruption. The whole issue, there is 
absolutely no question, and let’s just agree quickly on one issue of convergence and then let’s discuss the 
most pressing issues of the day. 
 
There is no question that at the end of the day, corruption has a huge element of being a symptom. It’s a 
very negative symptom. The corruption is not the fundamental ill but causes everything else. Corruption in 
turn is related to political inequality, is related to all kinds of historical institutions and we can discuss very 
much which ones Mushtaq prefers, which ones I prefer. There is a whole literature from MIT, from 
Cambridge, from many places. 
 
Transcript of Development Drums Episode 14 - Philanthrocapitalism 
 
5 
So obviously, corruption is a result also of many other problems. The issue of political inequality, the 
distinction between illegal and legal corruption, which we have written a lot about, is something worth 
noting and if anybody thought that poverty – still thought that poverty causes corruption, look at what 
happened in the financial crisis in the world. 
 
Look at the Wall Street corruption which a lot of it was legal, was capture – one issue that we have not 
discussed yet which is part of political inequality is capture of the regulatory framework and of the state, 
but by particularly powerful financial and industrial firms and that happens in many, many countries. And I 
assume that Mushtaq would not disagree with those manifestations. 
 
So which manifestation of corruption and which determinant of corruption matters a bit more or less, we 
can discuss that and there is a lot of areas of convergence and some of the areas of petty corruption may not 
matter as much as those grand corruption and some even legal corruption, which also happens in United 
States and the rich countries. 
 
Having said that, I think we need to have a hard look at the data and be very careful in not putting in the 
same group, India and Kenya, for instance. In countries like Kenya, the type of corruption and the extent 
and the magnitude and what has happened including at the very, very top – it has a group.  
 
And that’s why I think we need to be much more practical, get into the country, understand the country, 
read these books like by Michela Wrong to understand the nefarious effect that throughout history, 
corruption and the associated misgovernance has caused as opposed to India which is in another league. 
There is corruption in India. There is corruption in Wall Street too but it’s a completely different type and 
extent. And that’s where we need to get into the country and look into that. 
 
Botswana is a complete different story from very early on with anti-corruption and with better governance 
and Mauritius and Ghana and a number of other countries and have shown the way that by, from early on, 
fighting this and tackling these issues, they have managed to develop in a way that Kenya has stayed stuck 
for all these years, not to speak about Equatorial Guineas and other such countries. 
 
So let’s be very careful in not labeling India as totally corrupt as if it was a case like Equatorial Guinea 
because it’s a complete misunderstanding of the evidence. 
 
Owen Barder 
Okay. So I think I am seeing some convergence here, Mushtaq. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
I think this is remarkable. We are actually seeing some convergence with Danny Kaufmann. And I have 
been arguing for many years that there are many different types of corruption. And even within India, the 
corruption you find in places like Eastern Uttar Pradesh or Bihar is very different from the corruption you 
find in Tamil Nadu, which is very different from the corruption you find in Maharashtra. And I think this is 
precisely the kind of case study understanding of political-economic processes that we need to understand 
to be able to intervene effectively. 
 
I think there is – having achieved that, let me actually push that convergence a little bit further. 
 
Owen Barder 
Don’t rock the boat here; we’ve got a consensus. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
No, no, no. No, no, I think there are some substantial differences. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
But you agree, Mushtaq, Mushtaq, if I can come in, but you agree that at the top in India, you cannot 
compare with the kleptocracies that we have known in other countries. At the top in terms of their civil 
service, in other words, and the top political leadership in India, is it as corrupt as some of the other 
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countries that you are putting in the same group? That would be a complete misunderstanding, as opposed 
to local corruption, which is also a huge issue in China, I agree, but one has to distinguish. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
Yes, and my entire life’s work, Danny, has been about distinguishing these things and saying that if you 
look at the aggregate amounts of corruption in some indicators – opinion surveys and so on, you actually 
don’t understand the differences. And that’s precisely what I had been saying. So the reason why India does 
better than Kenya and China does better than India is to some extent related to the nature of these political-
economy differences and the types of corruption. That’s exactly what I have been saying for a very long 
time. So we are converging. 
 
Now the issue really is when you actually do your micro studies, there is one issue, which is, you shouldn’t 
forget the big historical picture. If the kinds of issues which the Kenyan evidence points out which I think – 
here is another convergence, okay. I can agree with you completely that if you have an aid project or if you 
have massive theft in the delivery of public services then you are not going to develop, okay? 
 
But there are lots of other things you need to actually achieve development. If you compare Kenya with 
China, with Malaysia, with even the bits of India, which are working relatively well, with South Korea and 
so on, is the difference between them primarily in the theft, which is taking place in projects, which 
undoubtedly is a difference or are there much more fundamental differences in the political organization of 
the transition and the way in which the transformations are happening in which new classes are coming up, 
in which new technologies are being adopted and so on, which I think are much more important so that if 
we focus our attention on getting a little bit of improvement in the corruption, which happens in projects, 
are we really going to see a transformation of Kenya into a China or even into a Malaysia or even into a 
Thailand. I don’t think so. 
 
So I think that while I agree with you that there are important differences in some aspects of corruption, 
there are other much more important political-economy differences which we forget, which we can only 
identify when we look at the historical process of transition that I am particularly interested in. And that 
doesn’t mean that there are any simple answers. 
 
And where the convergence is, is that we need to understand countries much better. We need to understand 
these processes of transformation much better. But we also need to keep our eye on the big historical 
picture. The big historical picture is a reason why China is developing and parts of India are developing and 
Korea developed before that is not just that their leaders were slightly less kleptocratic. How you measure 
kleptocracy is itself very important. 
 
Chinese leaders or South Korean leaders in absolute amounts made more money than any African leader 
can ever imagine. The thing is that they made their money by actually developing their economies. So there 
the much more fundamental question is why do some elites make their money by destroying their 
economies and others make their money by growing their economies.  
 
If you look at it in percentage terms, the percentage that the Chinese take might be less than the percentage 
that Kenyans take, but they make massively more, and they’re massively richer. So, ruling classes in these 
countries are rich because they are sharing in the growth of these countries. We shouldn’t forget that. So we 
have to understand deeper economic questions. 
 
Owen Barder 
Danny, what do you say to the argument that it isn’t the differences in corruption that determine the 
difference to why these countries are developing? There are other bigger, deeper issues that determine why 
Kenya is on one trajectory and India is on another. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Right, the difference is, it’s a very important first cut. And there’s no question that the overall difference 
and magnitudes in Kenya versus the magnitudes in India is a first cut big explainator [sic] but I agree that’s 
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not enough. Then one has to look at the different manifestations. But then again, we have to be very careful 
with inference and with the data. 
 
I have no evidence of how rich the top leaders of China got. They were not kleptocrats in my book and in 
the evidence I have. I would like to see the evidence that Mushtaq has to the contrary that those Chinese 
leaders – the issue is more at the local level and some at different party level and at the enterprise level, the 
state enterprise. 
 
So I think we need to be very careful with that, like the statement made before about India. But – 
 
Owen Barder  
Let’s put this to Mushtaq because I rather sympathize with that. I mean when you think of Mobutu flying in 
jumbo jets of flowers from Paris and things like that. Well, I don’t see any Chinese leaders ever having 
behaved like that. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
You are absolutely wrong. I mean if you actually look at the absolute level of Mobutu’s pathetic little 
houses in France and his pathetic palace in his country and you compare that – I mean I’ve personally 
known Chinese bureaucrats in South Asia who are doing deals for public sector Chinese companies.  
 
And if you look at their lifestyle, the clothes they wear, the cars they drive, the assets they control, it has a 
fantastically different magnitude and they are engaged in very close connections with their governments, 
with the governments in the developing countries interested to do business, they are public-private 
entrepreneurs. They combine political power with business. And they are superbly rich.  
 
Now if Danny wants a figure, obviously you can’t do a survey and say this is the asset base of –  
 
Owen Barder  
How much have you stolen? 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
But I think that in terms of qualitative observations of Chinese bureaucrats and Chinese public officials in 
business, forget in China because you can’t go and look at them in China, but if you look at them in India, 
in Bangladesh and Africa and you compare them with the African counterparts, they are on different 
planets. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Well, I think we need to make a very clear distinction between bureaucrats and the top political elite and 
the top leaders. I thought we were talking about the top leaders and, when we talk about kleptocracy, that 
clearly refers to the top leaders of their country.  
 
And Mobutu, in terms of percentage of the country in terms of the way he stole the assets of the country, 
it’s an extreme case but it’s not alone. Marcos commanded more wealth in that sense. But I have absolutely 
no evidence that the top Chinese political leaders did that. 
 
But let’s move on. I think another very important statement that Mushtaq made and I think it’s very 
important for policy today is historical determinants and understanding the history is absolutely crucial but 
perhaps because we come from a different background, from where we come, I have seen it in my own 
country, in Chile, yes, we can. 
 
The importance of current factors, if you have proper leadership, which we have not discussed, who 
understand the importance of taking the bull by their horns and saying we want to join the 21st century, 
have good institutions, good governance, anti-corruption, this has been the effort in Chile well before we 
started growing at such a pace. 
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And we are not alone. There are the Baltics. There are the Botswanas. There are a number of cases 
throughout the world that show that you do not have to be rich to afford the luxury of good governance and 
have very good rating in terms of not being corrupt relatively speaking. Chile today rates better than many 
rich OECD countries, including the Italys, the Greeces and a number of other countries in the world. So we 
need to concentrate and look at those cases and the importance that leadership can make. 
 
Owen Barder 
You’re listening to Development Drums with me, Owen Barder, in Addis Ababa and my guests, Daniel 
Kaufmann and Mushtaq Khan. If you have comments on this or any other episode of Development Drums, 
or if you would like to suggest topics or guests for future episodes, please do so by coming to the 
developmentdrums.org website or join the Development Drums group on Facebook. 
 
Can we focus on this question of changes that we can make and, in particular, this question of what kinds 
of improvements in governance improves growth? Because I know, Mushtaq, you’ve written about the 
difference between governance improvements that improve markets and governance improvements that 
improve economic growth. And I – sometimes in this literature these things are all bundled up together as if 
this is all one and the same thing. Unpack for us what you mean by that distinction and why it’s important. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
Let me unpack it by connecting it with the discussion before. Danny said that he doesn’t know of any 
evidence of kleptocracy in successful countries in the type that you see in Africa. I think the problem is that 
when you look at processes of accumulation in successful countries, they look different exposed, okay.  
 
There is a lot of case study evidence now of what happened in South Korea in the 1960s under the early 
Park Chung-hee and his successors, what is happening in the provincial level in China, what happened in 
Indonesia, what happened in Thailand during the 1980s, which shows that actually the difference between 
the accumulation of political leaders in high growth countries and low growth countries is not that one 
takes a lesser amount. It ends up as a lesser percentage because what is happening in the successful 
countries is that the leadership is constructing growth. And if you share in growth, it always looks less 
kleptocratic than if you are trying to share or extract from stagnation. 
 
So the political-economy question is what kinds of political leaderships do you need to have to construct 
growth and transformation? And this is what I call governance for growth. And what we need to learn (and 
I will come back to Chile and the Latin American examples later on) that the problem in poor countries 
making the transition is, putting it very bluntly, how do you construct humane and dynamic versions of 
capitalism. And this is a very difficult task because capitalism by its nature is not just, is not fair, and it’s an 
ugly beast, right. 
 
So when we’re talking about markets, you actually miss the elephant in the room, which is markets have 
existed in developing countries for thousands of years. We don’t need anyone to come and tell us about 
markets. India had markets when Europeans didn’t know what a bath was.  
 
The point is that to construct capitalism is something completely new. It’s a different hierarchy in societies, 
different asset structure, it’s very difficult to construct. You need to have a lot of elite cohesion to achieve 
that transformation without civil war breaking out. The problem with a lot of African countries and large 
parts of India as well is that that elite cohesion is very difficult to construct. The elites when they have 
cohesion don’t have a long enough time horizon so that they do a lot of looting instead of construction of 
capitalism from which they will actually end up better off. This is the problem.  
 
The issue with Chile, you see, is that in Chile the capitalist transition has already happened. It’s not – as I 
said earlier, it’s not a question of rich and poor. It’s a question of transition. You can be a relatively middle 
income capitalist country where the capitalist structure is already there and you just then keep your 5% 
growth going. The problem with – you can be a much richer country, which is, let’s say, state planned and 
you make a transition and then corruption and all these problems of elite cohesion break down. In Chile, 
that elite cohesion problem was solved through a lot of nasty historical processes which we all know about. 
So we don’t need to go into the history of Chile.  
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But right now, Chile has got a cohesive capitalist structure, which is not going through any fundamental 
transformations. And so even as a middle income country, it can do some, what I would call, market 
enhancing good governance. This is not the problem in China or India or Thailand and certainly not in 
Kenya where the elite cohesion itself doesn’t exist, the capitalist economy doesn’t exist, rich or poor, and 
capitalist sectors are very small and subject to a lot of redistributed conflicts with different factions and 
political movements, which each are trying to enter the capitalist game. That’s a very different political 
economy. 
  
Owen Barder 
So, Danny, what do you make of this idea that we need to think about governance reforms that promote 
growth rather than governance reforms that just promote markets? 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
I mean 10 years ago, we could have had that debate. Today, and I have written about it, it’s the era of the 
end of ideology and even if you look at the G20 and how there is no difference in major ideological terms 
including between the Chinas and the U.S. in terms of the fundamentals.  
 
And the Obama administration understands that these major interventions that are needed in certain parts of 
the markets. So I would like to re-integrate these old notions, the distinction between growth enhancing or 
market enhancing by suggesting that the operative concept should be market-friendly approaches to ensure 
that there is sustained growth.  
 
Now to ensure market-friendly approaches that are consistent with long-term sustained growth, governance 
is crucial. And we can get into all kinds of abstract social engineering of how to have a perfect construct for 
a country to do a transition but this is not a social engineering experiment at the academic level. This 
happens organically; each country with its own civil society, government nooks and crannies, have to go 
through. And let me suggest that we are grappling with major issues still in Chile today even though 
relatively speaking we are doing well exactly because of the still legacy of the Pinochet era where a few 
potentates still wielded enormous power in terms of subtle or not so subtle capture in the economy like in 
Wall Street. So this is by no means over. 
 
So we can talk about transition in any country now this including what’s happening now in the U.S. That's 
not very useful operative concept at a very practical level. At a very practical level, let me put it very much 
in front of you because there, I think, we agree with Mushtaq is not that one needs to fight corruption by 
fighting corruption. There are certain actions that need to be taken for more integrity and lack of corruption 
in aid and in projects and investment of course but how can we – who would disagree about the importance 
of transparency of a free press, of democratic accountability, of some contestability at the both political and 
economic level in terms of procurement putting everything on line. So let’s discuss concretely because this 
is what the people in Kenya, the citizens in Tanzania, in China and so on because by the way these 
kleptocrats were not confined to Africa. Remember the Marcos – the Marcoses and there are others, not to 
speak of others that remain in other parts of the world including my own continent. 
 
So let’s discuss concretely. Does anybody among us three disagree that we need to focus on those 
fundamental? In the past 15 years I’ve been monitoring the data. There are many more countries with 
democratic elections but there has not been an improvement around the world on a free press; to the 
contrary, there are reversals going against that in terms of further, further censorship. The same in terms of 
civil liberties and so on. The same in terms of transparency, does not seem to be increasing apace, in terms 
of disclosure of assets of the politician. Why don’t we talk about that rather than obstruct experiments in 
social engineering which is not how development takes place on the ground. 
 
Owen Barder 
Mushtaq, that seems a very fair challenge, because most ordinary people, not the experts in this topic 
listening to this podcast would be saying, ‘hear hear’ to that, free press, property rights, rule of law, 
democratic elections, what’s wrong with that as an agenda? Why aren’t those important things to pursue as 
part of the development debate? 
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Mushtaq Khan 
You’ve opened up a whole new can of worms now, because exactly what you could say about corruption, 
you could say about meaningful democracy, accountability, transparency, and so on. Are these things 
achieved through a process of development and the deepening of a productive sector and a deepening of the 
middle classes and civil society or are there preconditions of development? And I could say exactly the 
same thing about that agenda as before and I think while there is conversions, there is also, and thankfully, 
also areas of disagreements, so we can keep talking to Danny. 
 
I don’t think just because every country is going through some process of transition that every country is in 
transition. The transition that a Kenya has to go through to even to get to a position where it can employ its 
people is very different from the transition that the U.S. has to get through to solve massively damaging 
rent seeking in its financial sector. I think the difference is in the kinds of transition. So market friendly 
won’t – market friendly is a much older term than market enhancing and growth enhancing governance and 
so let’s come down to the concretes. I think the concrete is, is it the case that if you have transparency you 
can solve problems. Our people in Kenya or in India or in any country you can – Bangladesh which is 
where I come from, are they not aware of who is corrupt? And how they are corrupt? Everyone knows. 
 
The taxi driver you take from the airport to your hotel will tell you exactly who is corrupt and how they are 
corrupt and how much money they’ve made and they might even exaggerate a bit of what’s happening. 
That doesn’t help anyone to fight anything. Okay? Because the problem is the structural issues that we 
come down to. The same people who are complaining about corruption will vote for the most corrupt 
politicians because those are the politicians with the resources to protect them. Now these are the structural 
problems. If I am a voter and the only person who can protect me is a corrupt mafia boss and the honest 
guy can’t collect any tax to deliver anything to me, what does it mean to say I want an open democracy and 
I want a free press? 
 
The kinds of concrete issues that I would focus on are the concrete market failures that are constraining 
development. How do you actually construct a capitalist sector? How do you get land and resources to 
industry? How do you actually get the financing to industry in very risky areas where the market failures 
are so huge that the private sector won’t invest and it would take a generation to solve it by doing the 
market enhancing governance of contracts and rule of law? The reason why China succeeds is that there are 
very ad-hoc pragmatic solutions to these problems at the local level, that’s what Kenya should be learning 
about. China is not succeeding because it has a free press and an open democracy and all the rest of it, 
although that’s very desirable, I have no problem with saying, ‘yes, let’s go for that, we want – I want that 
anyway’. But I don’t think that the problem with – in Bangladesh is that people don’t know who is corrupt, 
that the problem in Bangladesh is that people don’t have political choices and there is no democracy. 
 
We have lots of choice between different corrupt people to vote for and you elect one load of corrupt 
people or another load of corrupt people and everybody knows that they are corrupt, this is not the problem. 
The problem is: how do you actually construct the prosperity which will allow us slowly to construct a 
social democratic form of capitalism where through the distribution of fiscal resources you can actually 
achieve poverty reduction and a good life for the maximum number of people, that’s my problem. 
 
Owen Barder 
Danny – so transparency is no use if you don’t have a way to change the… 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
It’s useful, it’s better than not having it but it won’t solve your problem. 
 
Owen Barder 
Danny? 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
First, no one single action will solve the problem, this is unfortunately the very complicated social sciences, 
development and not physics, so it has to be a combination and there we all agree that it is context specific, 
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so there is no one template that one arrives to, either Bangladesh or Chile and this is a Bible. Which one are 
– which are going to be the priorities and it’s very important to prioritize, are going to vary from one setting 
to another, each country’s transition is different but there is going to be a set of four or five priorities to just 
name a number that one has to put effort on those and the complementarity. When I speak about 
transparency or reforms, that’s an agenda that has to be complemented of course by enforcement, by 
institutional strengthening in other areas and so on. 
 
But I am not talking about making corruption more transparent which has been made much more 
transparent through many other ways, I am talking about the fundamental institutional level in terms of 
electoral finance, campaign finance, much more transparency in terms of the assets of candidates, of 
politicians in terms of procurement, I can give you – we can discuss a very concrete list of about 12 things 
that the reformists in reformist countries are doing. Mexico is one of the countries leading that effort. But 
of course it won’t suffice, but I mean that’s obvious, the question is, which transparency or reforms and it’s 
not just to say a number about corruption on who is corrupt again in the press. But which ones are crucial 
for which country and so on. 
 
Now I would also throw to the group; we’re in 2010 almost. 2010, every country has a market economy, 
with the possible exception of a handful which we could agree with, but Kenyans, anybody who has 
worked in this country; they all have it. The question is whether they are surviving, thriving, or operating in 
conjunction and with a helping hand of government or in spite of government. But there’s no such thing as 
country that have not undergone a transition. In fact, I lived Ukraine in the transition from the Soviet to the 
post-Soviet era, there was even a market during the Soviet era which was mostly informal and underground 
and the transition took place almost immediately even in the worst governed transitions in the post-Soviet 
Union, they all have a market. 
 
So let’s get real and see then ask the question, what in a very practical way are the most important priorities 
that in every country would matter? And there is no one Bible, I agree with that. But again we have not 
focused sufficiently on leadership and how a courageous leadership and reformist can change the name of 
the game in spite of the importance of historical determinant because that leads to a lot of fatalism. Some of 
the writings would say it’s all historically determined, and so much determinism when we have in Latin 
America, we and the neighbors have the same history, the same – the same – almost in every count on 
history and we have gone totally different ways, or Ukraine versus Poland, or the two Koreas, just taking 
case that is of two neighboring countries with very similar historical culture, geographical, colonial 
heritages. And they have gone very different direction depending on leadership, on reform, on governance 
reforms and so on.  
 
Owen Barder 
Can I ask about the role of outsiders in this, because one of the challenges for policy makers in 
development is what if anything external actors, whether it’s aid donors or other governments or indeed 
civil society and others from abroad could or should be doing to promote various kinds of basic governance 
in developing countries. You talked, Danny, about the importance of leadership which makes me wonder 
whether that’s just a historical accident. Let me start with Mushtaq, ask what do you think is the right role 
if any for external actors to promote the kinds of governance reforms you would like to see and the kind of 
broader governance agenda? 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
I think the external actors generally do a lot of damage because they bring in ideas which are half-baked 
and not very clearly defined, and some of it is evident in the discussion we’ve been having, right? I mean 
even two extremely well-read people like Danny and myself who have gone through the literature can’t 
even agree about our terminology because it seems that Danny keeps criticizing me for saying things which 
I’m not saying and gets it tangentially wrong. I am actually saying that… 
 
Owen Barder 
I’m sure he’d say the same about you. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
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Absolutely. I’m actually saying that markets have existed for thousands of years; that’s not the problem. 
The transition I’m talking about is not the transition to a market economy; that was a problem in Eastern 
Europe. The transition I’m talking about is a transition to capitalism. It’s a particular way of organizing 
production in societies with a particular distribution of assets which creates incentives for technology 
absorption and technology use, which creates incentives for exporting and growth and production, and that 
is extremely difficult to construct, it’s a very politically difficult and painful process of constructing 
capitalism. 
 
And the issues of governance that I would focus on is to look at the social and political and institutional 
constraints which are blocking that which are vast and huge in developing countries and which are only 
tangentially and very indirectly connected to things like transparency and electrical processes and so on, 
which are all important, but it doesn’t help me in asking why is it that Bangladesh only produces garments 
and can’t produce something else which is equally simple and trivial? And I could go into very concrete 
market failures in institutions and financing, in land acquisition, which are to me the most fundamental 
things you need to solve in those context and transparency and other things that we are discussing don’t 
address those growth enhancing governance issues. So the growth enhancing governance issue is I think 
very important and we don’t have time to go into that.  
 
Now in terms of what outsiders do, I think outsiders do a lot of damage by setting countries goals of 
governance which are actually unachievable. So what you come, I mean – and Danny has converged to 
some extent, but you know, 10 years ago a lot of people were saying, set countries targets for corruption, 
set countries targets for X, Y and Z governance indicators. If you bring down your governance indicator by 
two points you will have so many X percentage points of growth and so on. People were writing 
professional articles in refereed journals, in reputable journals of that time.  
 
Now what happens is when you go to a country and you set that kind of agenda, you mobilize a lot of 
people and real people hate corruption in developing countries, right? So it’s very easy to construct massive 
social movements fighting corruption, okay, because people don’t like corruption, I don’t like corruption, 
it’s horrible. So you mobilize all these people, you focus the political effort in fighting something and then 
you don’t actually explain to them that the problem is structural, that actually you can remove this 
government, put in another government. 
 
In Indonesia they got rid of this horrible guy called Suharto, and they ended up with a very pious and good 
and profound leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid who really wanted to fight corruption, and he ended up in 
one year’s time as corrupt as the previous one because his party, his structures, the way in which politics is 
maintained is corrupt. Now what you then end up with is something devastating, which is demoralization. 
You demoralize people because they begin to lose confidence in their own politics, in their own ability to 
change their lives, because you haven’t constructed achievable goals of governance which deliver anything. 
And this is the real problem with outside ideas coming in, which, in a most well-meaning way, are setting 
agendas which cannot be delivered, and you have seen that again and again and again in many, many 
developing countries. 
 
Owen Barder 
Danny, we are setting targets that can’t be delivered with the effect of demoralization? 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Well, the problem is in the notion of ‘we’. I mean, first, all this data, and we have been very bold as you 
know on indicators and doing surveys. This data is an empowering tool for the reformists and for the civil 
society within the countries, it’s not for an outsider to set the target. I mean, who would think that, although 
some organizations like to do that but obviously that’s not very useful, that’s for them to do and in fact 
looking carefully at the data is so important again to monitor what has been happening. In Indonesia over 
the past decade there has been an improvement in corruption from an extremely low base obviously but it’s 
going in the right direction and that’s moralizing for many people including the Minister of Finance who 
told me so that they like to look at these benchmarks and these numbers not because some outsider will tell 
them where they should be because they the reformist want to continue arguing for continuing that route. 
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The same with a – the reformist during the Yeltsin era in Russia and so on they used this, so these are 
empowering tools, so…  
 
Owen Barder 
So that’s the limit of external interference is that we provide benchmarks. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Let me answer that. So, one area is just knowledge sharing and data with all the problems and we should 
make it very clear with margins on error and so on but let’s empower everybody who is asking for, and 
there is so much demand for that, these tools for them then to monitor to do a data-driven policy making 
and monitoring and to empower them for more reforms.  
 
Second is to share the experiences of other parts of the world of other countries and some outsider is invited 
because they know and I have been in many countries when I accept an assignment is not to tell them what 
they should do is because they want to understand how others did it. These countries, the reformist 
countries nowadays they want performance-based management, performance-based improvement in 
governance, and they want to learn from the best examples from other places in the world and the outsiders 
can play a useful role in sharing information. 
 
Finally aid in a much more selective and careful fashion that is – than sometimes too indiscriminately can 
be very useful not in pushing or conditioning reforms from the outside but once you have a committed 
leadership, with integrity, to support them because sometimes they need resources and particularly in poor 
countries which they cannot get from foreign direct investment in the first phase. So aid can be useful in 
complementing those reforms but they have to start from within. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
See a lot of things that Danny says are very reasonable and at one level I don’t disagree with him. Of 
course, knowledge, information and experiences it’s all very important. The problem is that the way in 
which Western intellectual consensus is constructed. We are providing a very partial understanding of 
history and this is really a significant problem because I think that – I mean I worry that if you look at the 
historical examples of the really successful transitions in the last 50 to 100 years, if you look at the South 
Koreas, the Taiwans, the Singapores, the Malaysias, the Thailands, the Chinas, the one thing which is 
strikingly common to all of them is that outside advice played a very small role in their transitions. Right? 
 
I mean the South Koreans did not listen to what the World Bank was saying; the Taiwanese didn’t listen to 
governance advice, nor did the Chinese, nor did the Thais, nor did the Indonesians, and I – of course this is 
– I’m being rhetorical and slightly exaggerating this, I think that what each country has to find is its own 
political cohesiveness to carry out very painful and ugly transitions and I keep coming back to this. What 
we are talking about is a very difficult and painful transition where you are constructing a new society 
which is capitalist in a broad sense but which has many differences between countries, where the state 
plays a very significant role in the early setting up of industries, in technology acquisition, in the processes 
of transferring and transiting, from one economic structure to the other; those are processes which don’t fit 
and sit very easily in the intellectual structures and liberal economics and good governance, political 
philosophies, which Western countries have. 
 
And I admire and appreciate those values; I want to live by them, but I think that in many respects it’s very 
difficult to live by them and actually carry out a transition in the humane, just and efficient way in 
developing countries, and this is the problem that actually it might be that if the Chinese were in Africa, 
Africa might have an easier time paradoxically than with all the advice and which creates aspirations, 
which creates ambitions but which are very difficult to satisfy and you actually end up with greater social 
discord and greater social dissatisfaction.  
 
So at one level I agree with Danny. We need to have more information. We need to actually provide more 
examples and more history to developing countries but that should be on a more balanced way. I mean 
Chile is a very exceptional country to really focus on. We really need to look at China. We need to look at 
South Korea. We need to look at Japan. We need to look at Malaysia. Are those historical examples 
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understood enough in Africa? Are – do people really understand how South Korea, how Taiwan, how 
China, how Malaysia and what kinds of governance did they have to make those transitions. 
 
Owen Barder 
It strikes me that you are both being quite modest about what you think the role of outsiders should be. 
Even you, Danny, are talking about information benchmarking, lesson learning. I would think that most 
people who pay taxes to aid agencies think that we ought to be rather more sharp-edged than that; that we 
should be being tougher about not giving aid to countries, creating strong incentives for…  
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Yes. Absolutely. 
 
Owen Barder 
Countries to tackle corruption. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Absolutely. 
 
Owen Barder 
I’m just interested to know, Danny, do you think that’s the… 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Absolutely, maybe I said it very quickly but I said it, aid and finance, and financing development plays an 
important role but I said very clearly we need to be more selective. And we need to be more selective in 
ensuring that it’s good money that goes after basically good money go to – and a commitment to improve 
an institution’s governance and anti-corruption rather than not being sufficiently selective or not selective 
at all where at the end of the day those that are making very serious efforts are denied very important 
resources which are important for the reform. So in that sense the complementarity between aid and advice 
is very important. 
 
But also I agree with you, Owen, we should be – while we should not be very prescriptive in saying this is 
what’s going to work in your country, that has to be organically generated from within the country and led 
by the country. We should not be shy about saying how it happened elsewhere but also about what doesn’t 
work, and there is still a lot of mythology in terms of try this and try that, try, Singapore has been so 
successful, well, try Singapore in Kenya, good luck! 
 
So in 2010 we need to be much sharper edged and much more realistic on the ground of what can work. So 
we are back to the very basic question and, Owen, you summarized this very well, is how we should not be 
diverted with all kinds of abstract constructs from the basic issues in so many countries of rule of law and, 
yes, it will vary according to their diagnostic what aspect of the judiciary is most important, rule of law is 
missing and what part of enforcement. The basic issue of transparency and disclosure and which five 
reforms are crucial are very important, of the free press, of democratic accountability even in the own way 
of the country doesn’t have to be an Anglo-Saxon – totally Anglo-Saxon section approach but more 
democratic accountability and contestability in terms of their polity, it has to be part of this debate. 
 
And I would like to hear from Mushtaq an alternative for that for any country that you would tell, no, go 
the authoritarian route or some other variant, thereof of managed democracy which seems to be a fad 
nowadays in the Russias, and in a lot of African and Latin American countries. How can we basically get 
away with these all kinds of extraneous arguments from the very basic issues which you yourselves set up 
Owen? 
 
We need to go back to the basics because so many countries are getting away from that, and one excuse for 
that is the crisis by the way, where we are going to see, and that’s my last point for now, we’re going to see 
an increasing gap in governance institution and development outcomes because there’s one group of 
countries which are essentially reformist and another group which are basically sitting on the fence and 
using it as an excuse for coming up with all kinds of anti-market or anti-capitalist rhetoric and for now we 
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cannot act unless we are giving a lot of money in any case nor reforms. So you’re going to see some 
countries which are seizing this as an opportunity for reform after the debacle while others are going to stay 
further behind. So it’s very urgent to get to these practical issues now and not too lofty and abstract of an 
argument. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
I think it’s extremely important not be lofty but I think the loftiness of Daniel’s position is that he says that 
we should not be asking Kenya to become like Singapore which I completely and absolutely agree with. It 
would be ludicrous if I or anybody else suggested that Kenya should be like Singapore. My problem is that 
we are asking Kenya to be like Sweden and Norway, or like the United States, and that’s the problem. 
 
So the issue is not that we are setting Kenya a set of goals which are about how Kenya makes the transition 
to capitalism within Kenya in a way which is consistent with Kenya’s internal politics and its history and 
its existing technologies. We are not sitting down and identifying the market failures in its land markets, in 
its technology markets, in its financial markets and fixing those; we are focusing on issues like 
transparency, accountability, rule of law and so on, which don’t come from Singapore but they come from 
Norway, Sweden and the United States. And those are actually not achievable in any meaningful sense. 
 
And I disagree with Danny that these are settings realistic and pragmatic reform targets. They might be in 
some detail in some specific areas but in general they are actually in country after country that I work in 
and I have knowledge of actually creating discord and social dissatisfaction because it’s a reform agenda 
which is unimplementable. 
 
And in terms of aid I think it’s absolutely important there is a fiduciary responsibility to tax payers in rich 
countries that aid doesn’t get stolen. There is absolutely no question about that. Aid has to be managed and 
we have to ensure that aid is not stolen otherwise taxpayers in rich countries will stop giving aid. There is 
absolutely no problem with that. The problem is setting countries reform and governance targets, which, 
from my perspective, should be focused on only one thing, which is we have to understand that what is 
happening here is not about making markets work or having more accountability or something abstract and 
lofty like that, it’s something very nitty-gritty, which is, how do we move from our existing industrial and 
agricultural structure one or two steps up the value chain? What do we need to solve to do that? What are 
the market failures and institutional failures? 
 
And those are the governance areas, those particular agencies which deal with land allocation, the particular 
agencies that are managing finance and credit to upgrading technologies, that’s where if we spent a lot of 
our time and focus and got rid of the damaging kinds of rent seeking and corruption in those agencies and 
we understood that some rent seeking and some corruption might happen anywhere because it’s very 
difficult to get rid of all of that if we had a very pragmatic and practical approach to that and built up 
institutions and agencies at a very micro level which address these specific issues of transition building 
capitalism, we would be making progress in Kenya without getting lofty and without getting unnecessarily 
profound. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
I’ll just say one thing, United States, by the way, has to undergo a major transition, anybody who would 
suggest that anybody should follow the example of United States after what has happened and it’s just a 
question of not only reading the speeches of Obama but also seeing some of the actions and wait – and just 
wait after the health reform packet is passed what’s going to happen in terms of the renewed effort on the 
regulation of Wall Street and so on. 
 
So there is absolutely no question that the United States has to go also through a transition and that’s 
extremely important to understand on many of these countries rather than trying to attain the perfection of 
any U.S. model, I don’t know who would say something like this, so these has to be put in perspective and 
it’s not the issue of the Nordics either. But again we’re back to the question of how in a very concrete way 
one can suggest when one goes to these countries good examples of good transitions in terms of their rule 
of law issues, in terms of their transparency issues, in terms of how to improve and make procurement 
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better, in terms of the competitiveness in their polity and so on and making a market, let markets function 
with the needed regulations. So that’s the end of ideology. 
 
Owen Barder 
On what was very nearly a point of convergence that transition applies to countries both in the developing 
world and in the industrialized world. I’d like to thank both of you, Danny Kaufmann; thanks very much 
for coming on Development Drums. 
 
Daniel Kaufmann 
Thank you. 
 
Owen Barder 
And Mushtaq Khan, thank you for coming on Development Drums. 
 
Mushtaq Khan 
Thank you. And the meaning of transition is where we disagree. Thank you. 
 
Owen Barder 
Thank you both.  
 
 
 
 
 
***** 
